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Abstract
In Internet auctions bidders frequently bid in one of three ways: ei-
ther only early, or late, or they revise their early bids. This paper
rationalizes all three bidding patterns within a single equilibrium. We
consider a model of a dynamic auction in which bidders can search
for outside prices during the auction. We ￿nd that in the equilibrium
bidders with the low search costs bid only late and always search,
while the bidders with high search costs bid early or multiple times
and search only if they were previously outbid. An important feature
of the equilibrium is that early bidding allows bidders to search in a
coordinated manner. This means that everyone searches except the
bidder with the highest early bid. We also compare the static and
dynamic auction and conclude that dynamic auction is always more
e¢ cient but not always more pro￿table.
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11 Introduction
Bidding behavior in Internet auctions displays intriguing regularities that are
often di¢ cult to rationalize given the complexity of the Internet environment.
However, it is important to understand how people bid in these auctions,
because in the end, this is what determines their e¢ ciency and pro￿tability
properties. Bidding data from various auction sites suggest that frequently
occurring bidding patterns can be divided into three broad categories: early
bidding, late bidding and multiple bidding. Both early and late bidding
refer to a single bid placed by a single bidder. In the former case the bid
arrives in the few initial days and in the latter case on the last day of the
auction. Multiple bidding occurs when a bidder revises his earlier bid later
in the auction. Most of the literature addresses each of the three bidding
patterns separately (see Roth and Ockenfels 2002, Rasmusen 2006, Hossain
2008, and Compte and Jehiel 2004) and only little attention has been devoted
to the question whether these three patterns could arise jointly in a single
equilibrium. The intuition would suggest that if, for example, incentives to
bid late are superior to those for bidding early, we might expect that in time
the late bidding would replace the early bidding in the data. But this has not
happened. On the contrary, all three bidding patterns are very much present
in the data. In what follows we present a model which illustrates that the
equilibrium behavior can be consistent with all three bidding patterns. This
provides a uni￿ed and intuitive explanation for major empirical regularities.
Central to our argument is the idea that during the auction some bidders
may want to embark on a costly search for alternative outside prices. The
value of early bidding is in that it allows ￿coordination￿of search decisions
of those bidders who ￿nd it di¢ cult to search and want to avoid it. Conse-
quently, the bidder with the highest early bid remains passive while everyone
else searches. These incentives are responsible for early and multiple bidding.
On the other hand, the late bidding is caused by bidders for whom searching
is easy and who always want to look for outside prices before they bid in the
auction. They do not want to bid early because having their early bid tied
up in the auction could cause them to miss out on a good deals they may
￿nd on the outside. In the equilibrium of our model both of these incentives
coexist.
Bidders in Internet auctions are not necessarily interested in buying the
object at any price, but rather, they are looking for a good deal. In the
auction, if the price rises too high, they might decide to look for a better
2deal elsewhere. What complicates the matter is that the price searching
is costly in terms of time and e⁄ort. Bidders with di⁄erent locations or
time constraints may also have di⁄erent search costs. For instance, a bidder
looking for a car in Los Angeles is going to have many opportunities to shop
around at di⁄erent dealers compared to a bidder in Montana. Therefore, for
the Montana bidder, the Internet auction may be the only way to ￿nd the
car he wants. He can bene￿t from signaling his high search costs to the other
bidders by making a high early bid. It is much easier for the bidder in Los
Angeles to search for outside prices and therefore he may want to keep his
options open by placing a small early bid. Once he is outbid, he realizes that
he faces an opponent who is in￿ exible and this induces him to intensify his
search. As a result, both bidders bene￿t. The Los Angeles bidder bene￿ts
from a low price that he ￿nds at the dealer and the Montana bidder bene￿ts
from reduced competition in the auction. The model presented in this paper
captures the essence of this story.
Internet auctions have two distinguishing features. The ￿rst is that they
can last for several days. This allows bidders to come and go as they wish
and revise their bids in discrete time intervals. The second feature is proxy
bidding, which is implemented by numerous auction sites, including eBay.
When a bidder enters a proxy bid, the auction automatically bids for the
bidder up to the minimum amount needed to outbid the highest competing
proxy bid. Proxy bidding e⁄ectively gives the auction the properties of a
second-price auction. Our model contains both of these features. We con-
sider a simple second-price auction with two discrete bidding rounds: early
and late. In both rounds bidding occurs simultaneously and after the early
bidding round the second highest early bid, or the ￿standing price,￿is pub-
licly revealed. Between early and late bidding round all bidders get a chance
to learn an outside price. We call this a searching round. A decision to
search implies that a bidder gets his outside price but pays a search cost. In
the model we focus on the heterogeneity in bidders￿search costs rather than
their valuations. Therefore, bidders have private search costs but value the
object equally, at one.
We characterize an equilibrium in which bidding activity occurs in both
bidding rounds. The equilibrium can produce all aforementioned bidding
patterns, early late and multiple bidding. The early and multiple bidding
are caused by bidders who have su¢ ciently high search costs. Early bids
are increasing in search costs and allow ￿implicit coordination￿ of search
decisions. The bidder with the highest search cost submits the highest early
3bid and becomes the high bidder. This means that, in equilibrium, he passes
while all other bidders search. Similarly, all other bidders who are outbid
in the early round infer that the high bidder passes, and hence, they search.
A strategy which allows this type of coordination is the crucial part of the
equilibrium and we refer to it as the searching-when-loosing strategy.
In the late bidding round the high bidder revises his bid up to his valuation
(one). All other bidders have searched and bid their outside prices. But not
all late bids are recorded. This accounts for the di⁄erence between early and
multiple bidding. To illustrate the di⁄erence, a high bidder who has bid less
than his value in the early round will revise his bid to one in the late round.
This bidder has both bids recorded and becomes a part of multiple bidding
pattern. On the other hand, a bidder who has the second highest early bid is
the one that sets the standing price and then searches. If he ￿nds an outside
price which is below the standing price, then he opts out of the auction and
purchases the object for the outside price. In his case only the early bid is
recorded and he would become a part of an early bidding pattern.
The late bidding part of the equilibrium is qualitatively di⁄erent. Late
bidding is due to the bidders who have low search costs. These bidders bid
just late and always search. To see the intuition, suppose that a bidder has
a zero search cost, i.e., he can search e⁄ortlessly. Because there is always a
chance that the outside price could be very low (e.g., the object is on sale at
the store nearby) he will search irrespective of whether he expects the other
bidders to search or not. Since it doesn￿ t cost him anything to search, then
why not do it. It makes no sense for this bidder to bid early in the auction,
because if he does, then he would be risking winning the auction at the price
which is higher than what the outside price could be. In equilibrium, this
type of bidder always searches and bids his best outside alternative only late
in the auction.
The predictions of our model are consistent with large body of empiri-
cal evidence. It speci￿cally addresses two features of the bidding data that
we ￿nd puzzling: the large proportion of bids that arrive quite early in the
auction; and the coexistence of all three bidding patterns, early, late and
multiple bidding, in similar proportions1. Shmueli et al. (2004) for example
report that in their sample of 196 auctions on 189 Palm M515 device about
1Two other bidding patterns occur frequently in the data: ￿sniping￿￿bidding in the
dying moments of the auction (Roth and Ockenfels 2002); and ￿nibbling￿￿revising own
bid in small increments and short time intervals (Hossain 2008). Our model does not
speci￿cally address these two bidding practices.
430% of all bids arrive in the ￿rst half of the auction duration and 50% within
one quarter of the auction duration to go. More detailed description of bid-
ding behavior is given by Bapna and Gupta (2003) who split their sample of
about 90 auctions for variety of objects into three groups that are closely re-
lated to our categorization. The early bidders are referred to as ￿evaluators,￿
late bidders as ￿opportunists,￿and multiple bidders as ￿participators.￿On
average, early bidders occur in about 40% of cases, late bidders in about
23% of cases and multiple bidders in the remaining 37% of cases. Shah et al.
(2004) analyzed a large dataset consisting of 11 537 eBay auctions for Sony
Playstation 2 and Nintendo consoles. They ￿nd signi￿cant proportions of
early and late bidders, 28% and 38% respectively. The remaining portion of
bidders bid multiple times.
The most closely related paper is by Rasmusen (2006). He considers a
dynamic auction with an informed bidder who knows his private value and
an uninformed bidder. The uninformed bidder can learn his value during the
auction by paying a discovery cost. In equilibrium, the uninformed bidder
bids early and learns his value only if he is outbid. Rasmusen highlights the
fact that sometimes, depending on his valuation, the informed bidder has
incentives to bid late or randomize his early bid (signal-jamming) because he
can pro￿t from keeping the other bidder uninformed. Our model is di⁄erent
in several respects and provides di⁄erent incentives for late bidding. The
key observation is that getting an outside price can only lower the maximum
willingness to pay of a particular bidder, and hence, creates a positive exter-
nality for everyone else. Thus, a bidder never wants to keep his opponents
uninformed. Late bidding in our model is due to bidders with very low search
costs who simply do not want to have their bids tied up in the auction before
they search for outside prices.
Other related papers are by Hossain (2007), Rezende (2005), and Compte
and Jehiel (2004). Hossain, just like Rasmusen, considers a model with
informed and uninformed bidders. Every time the standing price changes,
each uninformed bidder obtains a better estimate of his private valuation by
getting a free signal of whether he likes the object at that price or not. This
induces the uninformed bidders to experiment by repeatedly revising their
bids during the auction - a behavior Hossain calls ￿nibbling.￿Both Rezende
and Compte & Jehiel look at ascending clock-auction environment. In the
￿rst paper a bidder can pay a cost to re￿ne his private valuation during the
auction and in the second paper he can discover the level of competition, i.e.,
how many other bidders are in the auction. Both papers demonstrate that
5information acquisition during the auction is valuable. The current paper is
also partially related to various streams of literature on preemptive bidding
pioneered by Fishman (1988), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988), on value learning
and entry, McA⁄ee and McMillan (1987), Levine and Smith (1994), and
on value learning and e¢ ciency, Persico (2000), Bergemann and V￿lim￿ky
(2002) and, Schwarz and Sonin (2005).
There has been a growing interest in comparing a static and a dynamic
auction formats. Both types of auctions, short (static) and long (dynamic),
are used frequently on the Internet. Several studies have argued that in vari-
ety of environments dynamic auctions achieve greater e¢ ciency and revenue
than static auctions, see Compte & Jehiel (2007) and Rezende (2005). The
current paper also contributes to this debate by arguing, that in our setting,
the dynamic auction is always more e¢ cient than the static auction. Fur-
thermore, we con￿rm the previous claims that the dynamic auction is more
pro￿table for large number of bidders, but we also illustrate by using an ex-
ample that in some cases the static auction may generate a higher revenue.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we set up
the model. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium behavior, ￿rst in the simpler
common outside prices environment and then later in the more appropriate
environment with independent and private outside prices. In section 4 we
compare the welfare and revenue of a static and a dynamic auction format.
Lastly, we conclude by a short discussion of our results.
2 The Model
The model is a simpli￿ed version of an Internet auction environment. The
primary di⁄erences between the Internet-type auctions and standard "text-
book" auction formats are the multiple rounds of bidding, the proxy-bidding
and the availability of outside buying opportunities. We integrate these fea-
tures into our model.
There is a single object o⁄ered in the auction. The object is worthless
to the seller, i.e., v0 = 0. In addition, there are other units of the same
object o⁄ered in the outside market at posted prices. There is n ￿ 2 number
of bidders. All bidders are risk neutral and have a common valuation for a
single unit of the object, v = 1. Bidders bid for the object in the auction
but before it closes, any bidder may invoke a private o⁄er (an outside price),
qi. The outside price is a random draw from an atomless distribution F[0;1]
6with density f: To get qi, a bidder has to pay a search cost ci v G[0;￿ c];
which is his private type, and is drawn independently for each bidder before
the auction. We assume that G is atomless, strictly increasing and that the
upper bound ￿ c is su¢ ciently large, ￿ c ￿ 1 ￿ E[qi], so that some types in the
support will not ￿nd it worthwhile to learn the outside price at all.
The game has three rounds: the early (bidding) round, the searching
round, and the late (bidding) round, i.e., r 2 fe;s;lg. The bidding format
is a dynamic (two-round), second-price auction. Bidding takes place in the
early and late round. Each bidding round, r 2 fe;lg, begins with all bidders
simultaneously placing their bids bi;r 2 [0;1]. Let br be the vector of all bids
placed in round r and denote by b
(k)
r the k-th highest bid. If several bids
are tied then their relative rank is decided randomly. A bidder cannot lower
his bid between rounds, i.e., bi;e ￿ bi;l. At the beginning of each round all
bidders observe the current auction price. The opening price in the auction
is set to zero: Since no bidding takes place in the searching round, the same
standing price, p, is observed at the onset of both the searching round and
the ￿nal bidding round. The standing price equals to the second highest
early bid, p = b
(2)
e . Finally, after the auction closes, the ￿nal auction price
equals to the second highest overall bid2, b
(2)
l :
The auction begins with the early bidding round. All bidders simultane-
ously place bids in the auction. Before the searching round, each bidder ￿rst
observes the standing price, p; and who is the current high bidder3, W,
W(be) =
￿
i if bi;e = b
(1)
e
￿ if bj;e = 0 for all j
:
Note that if bi;e = 0, then W 6= i. Bidding zero has the same e⁄ect and
could be interpreted as not having bid at all. The pair fp;Wg we refer to
as history. In the searching round all bidders decide whether they want to
search for an outside price, qi. A bidder who searches incurs a search cost, ci,
and gets a price draw, qi. In the late bidding round bidders submit another
round of bids. Then, the auction closes and any bidder who has searched can
purchase the object at his outside price.
2At any point in the auction a single bidder can have only a single valid bid placed in
the auction. Hence, if a bidder raises his early bid then his old lower bid is automatically
canceled and he is committed to his new higher bid. With this rule it cannot happen that
a bidder would set a price for himself.
3The current high bidder is the one who would be awarded the object if the auction
ended at that moment.
7To examine the payo⁄s let ￿i 2 f0;1g indicate whether bidder i has
searched, (￿i = 1), or passed, (￿i = 0). Similarly, let ￿i 2 f0;1g indicate
whether i has won the auction (￿i = 1) or not, (￿i = 0). The ex-post payo⁄
to bidder i if he had won the auction is given by
Vi(￿i;￿i) = ￿i(1 ￿ b
(2)
l ￿ ￿ici) + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i(1 ￿ qi ￿ ci):
A strategy for a bidder i is a triple
(￿i;e(ci); ￿i(ci;p;W); ￿i;l(ci;qi;p;W));
where ￿i;e is the early round bidding function; ￿i is the probability of search-
ing and ￿i;l is the bidding function in the late round.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibria. Our solution concept is the Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium. We restrict our attention to equilibria in symmet-
ric and pure strategies. Notice, that due to symmetry restriction, a strategy
has no bidder subscript, i.e., (￿e(ci); ￿(ci;p;W); ￿l(ci;p;W)): Furthermore,
since we consider only pure strategies in the searching round, then each bid-
der either searches or passes with probability one, i.e., ￿ 2 f0;1g:
Finally, we do not allow the use of dominated strategies in the late bid-
ding round. The standard argument, due to Vickrey (1962), by which value
bidding is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion applies to the late bidding round. If the bidder did not search, then
his ex-post payo⁄ belongs to f1 ￿ b
(2)
l ;0g, since he gets nothing if he loses
the auction. If he did search, then his outside price is drawn from the unit
interval, i.e., qi 2 [0;1], and his ex-post payo⁄ belongs to f1 ￿ b
(2)
l ;1 ￿ qig.
The value of the outside price determines the maximum willingness to pay
for the object in the late bidding round. This puts us to the Vickrey￿ s world
in which bidding qi is an undominated strategy (see Wang, 2006). Hence, in
the late bidding round, each bidder revises his early bid upwards whenever




max[bi;e;qi] if searched : (1)
Notice that if the outside price is lower than the standing price, then
bi;l = bi;e, which e⁄ectively means that the bidder has chosen to drop out
8of the auction, i.e., his bid cannot win the auction. This goes back to the
di⁄erence between early and multiple bidding. Since from this point on we
are mostly going to refer to bidding behavior in the early bidding round, for
the sake of exposition we will drop the subscript indicating the round and
rather use b and ￿ when referring to the early bid and the early bidding
function respectively.
3.1 Common Price Draws
This section presents a simpler version of the model in which price draws
are common, i.e., qi = q for all i, and q v F[0;1]: All bidders get the same
draw if they decide to search. In order to understand the incentives for early
bidding we begin by looking at the expected payo⁄s in the searching round.
Here, a bidder￿ s payo⁄ from searching or passing will depend on whether he
was outbid after the early bidding round. There can be two cases: either
bidder i is the high bidder after the early round, W = i; or he is not, W 6= i.
We look at either of these cases in turn.
Suppose ￿rst that in the searching round bidder i is the high bidder and
p is the standing price. If i searches, then he pays his search cost ci, learns




￿j each of the remaining bidders searches and bids q in
the ￿nal round. If q > p; then no matter whether i wins or looses4, he gets
1 ￿ q. If, on the other hand, q ￿ p, then bidder i wins the auction and gets
1 ￿ p. With probability (1 ￿ ￿￿i) at least one of the remaining bidders does
not search and bids 1: Then, i loses the auction and buys the object for the




(1 ￿ max[p;q])f(q)dq + (1 ￿ ￿￿i)
Z 1
0
(1 ￿ q)f(q)dq ￿ ci: (2)
When bidder i passes, then he revises his bid to 1 in the late bidding
round. The only way how he can get a positive payo⁄ is when all other
bidders search, i.e., with probability ￿￿i. In that case he wins the auction
4He can loose if q > bi. Then, all bidders bid q in the ￿nal bidding round and the
winner is determined by chance.




(1 ￿ max[p;q])f(q)dq: (3)
Now suppose that i is not the high bidder, W 6= i, after the early round.
First notice that when another bidder is the high bidder, W = j, then j has
the highest early bid, bj = b(1), and in our auction only he knows its value.
However, to keep things simple, let us suppose for a moment that bj were
publicly observable5. When i searches, then he pays the search cost, ci, gets
the outside price and possibly revises his ￿nal round bid to max[bi;q]. Then,
if he looses the auction, he pays the outside price, q, and, if he wins, he pays
the auction price equal to q. In either case, he gets 1￿q. Hence, the expected
payo⁄ from searching is
1 ￿ E[q] ￿ ci: (4)
In the opposite case, when i does not search, he raises his late round bid
to 1 and outbids j￿ s high early bid. The auction￿ s price in the ￿nal bidding
round jumps to bj. Then, if all other bidders search, i gets 1￿max[bj;q] and






Notice that (3) and (5) are essentially the same. The only di⁄erence
is that in (3) i is the high bidder after the early bidding round and p =
b(2) = bj is publicly observable, while in (5) b(1) = bj is observed only by the
high bidder. Importantly, i￿ s own bid does not directly in￿ uence his payo⁄
form passing. Secondly, since (4) is greater than (2), then if i is going to
search, he prefers to be the low bidder rather than the high bidder. But
again i￿ s early bid bi does not enter any of the value functions explicitly.
Bidding in the early round matters only to the extend that it determines
whether i is the high or the low bidder. This di⁄erence is important. Being
a high bidder implies certain commitment to buying the object at the going
5It will be seen later that whether bj is observable or not is irrelevant for our results.
6Here we make use of the temporary assumption that i is able to observe the high
bid b
(1)
j . However, as was already mentioned, this assumption was made for convenience
purposes only and none of the results depend on it.
10price while being the low bidder carries no such commitment. Thus, for the
same standing price, searching is relatively less attractive when one is the
high bidder (the expected ￿nal price is E[max[p;q]]) than when one is the
low bidder (the expected ￿nal price is E[q]). This possibility of commitment
by placing high early bid is what allows a bidder to signal his search cost
to the other bidders as discussed in the introduction. A searching strategy7
which most naturally re￿ ects this payo⁄ asymmetry between being a high
versus a low bidder is what we call the searching-when-loosing strategy.
De￿nition: A strategy by which bidder i searches when he is the low
bidder (W 6= i) and passes otherwise (W = i) we call the searching-when-
loosing strategy.
Next we show that this strategy is not only intuitively appealing but also
a part of an early bidding equilibrium in which all bidders bid early.
Proposition 1: There is an early bidding equilibrium such that:
(i) All bidders with cost ci < 1 ￿ E[q] bid bi in the early bidding round,
which is determined uniquely as a solution to
Z 1
0
max[bi;y]f(y)dy ￿ E[q] = ci. (6)
In the searching round, the low bidder searches and the high bidder passes,
￿(ci;p;W) =
￿
0 if W = i
1 if otherwise .
(ii) All bidders with cost ci ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] bid their value, 1, in the early
bidding round and pass in the searching round, ￿i = 0.
In the late bidding round all bidders bid bi;l.
Proof: Appendix.
There are a few notable features of this equilibrium. The early round
bidding function is strictly increasing and concave up to a threshold, 1￿E[q],
at which point there is a kink and the function becomes ￿ at. For all types
ci < 1￿E[q], the optimal bid b￿
i equates the bene￿ts from becoming the low
bidder who searches (4), with the bene￿ts of becoming the high bidder who
7Here we refer to a behavioral strategy in the searching round.
11passes (3). The kink occurs at 1￿E[q] where the expected bene￿t of searching
is zero. All bidders with higher costs bid their value 1 and do not search.
We refer to cost interval [0;1￿E[q]] as the relevant cost range, because only
on this interval bidders face nontrivial decision whether to search or pass.
All bidders with costs exceeding 1￿E[q] never search. Therefore, nothing
that could happen in the early bidding round would a⁄ect their searching
behavior. But these types are still useful in the model, because their bidding
and searching behavior a⁄ects the decisions of the others.
An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that bidders in the relevant
cost range (ci ￿ 1￿E[q]) implicitly coordinate8 their search decisions through
early bidding. The high bidder passes while the low bidder searches. Because
the early round bidding function is strictly increasing it is the bidder with
the lower search cost that is outbid in the early round and then searches. As
will be seen later, this type of coordinated search has a positive impact on
e¢ ciency.
What makes such coordination possible is the use of the searching-when-
losing strategy. It makes the (early round) equilibrium bidding function
robust in the following sense. Conditional on players following the equilib-
rium play in the continuation game (in the searching and the ￿nal bidding
round), the early round equilibrium bid weakly dominates any other. As a
result, the early round bid does not depend on the number of bidders n nor
on the distribution of their types G. A quick look at (6) reveals that neither
n nor G appears in it. These features of the equilibrium are best illustrated
by the following example.
Example 1: Consider just two bidders i 2 fA;Bg. Suppose that ci ￿
U[0;1] and q ￿ U[0;1]. Then, searching is valuable for any ci < 1 ￿ E[q] =
1=2, i.e., the relevant cost range is [0;1=2]. Hence, all ci < 1=2 use an
early round equilibrium bidding function
p
2ci which then allows them to
coordinate their search decisions. All ci ￿ 1=2 on the other hand would
never search and hence they bid 1 in the early round.
8The word ￿coordinate￿usually implies some sort of communication on the part of the
bidders. Since our environment is purely non-cooperative we want to emphasize that the
type of coordination we refer to is implicit - or, in other words, in the equilibrium bidders
act as if they coordinated their search.
12Figure 1
Notice that conditional on sticking to the equilibrium in the continuation
game bidding
p
2ci (weakly) dominates any other bid. In other words, it is
the best response to an arbitrary bid by the opponent. To see the intuition
behind this consider what happens when A bids slightly more or slightly less,
i.e., when
p
2cA ￿ ￿ for an arbitrarily small and positive ￿. We will only
illustrate the upward deviation,
p
2cA +￿, but the same logic applies to the
opposite case of
p







2cA + ￿; win the auction and in both cases A gets
the same payo⁄given by (3) where ￿B = 1. Alternatively, if
p
2cA+￿ < bB;
then A looses the auction in both cases and his payo⁄ from both bids is the
same, i.e., given by (4) where ￿B = 0.







2cA ￿ bB <
p
2cA+￿: In this case, bidding bA causes A to become
the low bidder after the early round, W = B, and his expected payo⁄ is












Now consider what happens when A bids
p
2cA + ￿ instead. Then, he be-








13The optimality of bA requires that (7) is as least as big as (8) which is
true since
p
2cA ￿ bB: 4
The early bidding equilibrium provides a rationale for the early bidding
behavior. But the equilibrium is not unique. One can construct other equi-
libria but these would involve rather unrealistic features9, such as, pooling
on a single bid, which cannot be easily reconciled with the observed bidding
behavior on the Internet. We do not pursue these equilibria further here but
rather focus on another important question of late bidding. In the introduc-
tion we stressed the fact that there are three distinct bidding patterns in the
data. But the early bidding equilibrium can rationalize only early and mul-
tiple bidding. Therefore, it tells only part of the story. In the next section
we show that by relaxing the somewhat restrictive assumption of common
outside prices, we obtain an equilibrium in which the behavior is richer and
generates all three bidding patterns.
3.2 Private Price Draws
This section presents our main result. As mentioned before, we drop the
assumption of the common price draws and rather focus on the case of in-
dependent and private outside prices, qi ￿ F[0;1]. Private outside prices
seem more realistic. One could argue that all people do not shop in the same
store which was one of the interpretations of the common price draws. We
will illustrate the impact of private price draws on the behavior in the pre-
viously discussed equilibria. A remarkable result of this section is that the
heterogeneity of price draws gives rise to an equilibrium in which a certain
proportion of low-cost types bid just late and the rest bid early.
Proposition 2: Suppose that outside prices are identically and indepen-
dently distributed. There is a free bidding equilibrium in which:
9One can construct an equilibrium in which all bidders with types in [0;t] (where t <
1￿E[q]) use an increasing bidding function in the early round and then follow searching-
when-loosing strategy in the searching round (e.g., just like described by Proposition 1);
and the remaining types in [t;￿ c] pool on the same bid ￿(t) and search only when they are
the high bidder and pass otherwise. This type of equilibrium is not very intuitive mostly
because it relies on pooling at a particular bid. Furthermore the equilibrium is not robust
to larger number of bidders and to distributions G that put more mass on the higher end
of the support. For these reasons we do not pay further attention to such equilibria.
14(i) All bidders with cost ci < ^ c bid zero, bi = 0, in the early bidding round
and search ￿i = 1 in the searching round.




(1;n￿1)(y)dy ￿ E[q] = ci. (9)
In the searching round the low bidder searches and the high bidder passes,
￿(ci;p;W) =
￿
0 if W = i
1 if otherwise .
(iii) All bidders with cost ci ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] bid their value, bi = 1, in the
early bidding round and pass in the searching round, ￿i = 0.
In the late bidding round all bidders bid bi;l.
The threshold ^ c is given by
^ c = E[q
(1;n￿1) ￿ min[qi;q
(1;n￿1)]].
O⁄-equilibrium path, when p 2 (0;￿(^ c)), beliefs are set in the following
way: if W = i, then c￿i ￿ G[0;￿
￿1(p)] and if W = j, then cj ￿ G[￿
￿1(p);￿ c]
and ck ￿ G[0;￿
￿1(p)] for all k 6= i;j.
Proof: Appendix.
The signi￿cance of this of equilibrium is that it is intuitive and encom-
passes all three types of bidding patterns discussed in the introduction: early
(parts i and ii of the equilibrium), late (part iii), and multiple bidding (parts
i and ii). Heterogeneity of the outside prices impacts the early bidding equi-
librium from the previous section in three di⁄erent ways. The ￿rst is the
emergence of the late bidding part, part (i) in Proposition 2. Secondly, the
bidding function now depends on the number of bidders. As the number of
bidders grows, the proportion of late bidders in part (i) of the equilibrium
increases (^ c increases) and the bidding function in part (ii) gets steeper.10
Interestingly, there is always a jump at ^ c. The reason is that a bidder
with cost ^ c is exactly indi⁄erent between bidding zero followed by searching
and biding positive amount followed by passing. Conditional on winning the
10It is also worth pointing out that the bidding function in part (ii) is ￿well-behaved￿
in the sense that it is continuous and increasing on [^ c;1 ￿ E[q]] and all bids are within
bounds [0;1], i.e., one can easily verify that ￿(^ c) > 0 and ￿(1 ￿ E[q]) = 1.
15auction he would get 1 ￿ min[qi;q
(2)
￿i] ￿ ^ c in the ￿rst case and 1 ￿ q
(1)
￿i in the
second case. Thus, there is a trade-o⁄ between paying a lower ￿nal auction
price (the second highest outside price) on one hand and avoiding paying the
search cost on the other hand.
The third and the last di⁄erence is that the late bidders always search.
Recall that with common outside prices it could have never happened that
all bidders searched in equilibrium. Here it can happen in part (i) of the
Proposition 2. All these di⁄erences are tied to the extra private gains from
searching when outside prices are private and independent. The intuition
behind this is illustrated in the following example which is a continuation of
Example 1.
Example 2 (late bidding behavior): With the parameters from Ex-
ample 1 the early round bidding function has the following structure: ^ c = 1=6





0 if ci 2 [0;1=6] p
2ci if ci 2 [1=6;1=2]
1 if ci 2 [1=2;1]
,
To see the rationale behind the late bidding behavior let us illustrate why
couldn￿ t it be an equilibrium for all bidders with cost ci ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] to bid p
2ci in the early bidding round (just like in Proposition 1). If this were
the case, then some low search cost types would ￿nd it pro￿table to deviate.
Consider bidder A with search cost cA very close to zero. In the supposed
equilibrium he bids
p
2cA: The other bidder B sets the standing price by
bidding
p
2cB = p. Then, if A is the high bidder,
p
2cA ￿ p, he passes and
B searches which gives A
1 ￿ E[max[p;qB]]: (10)














which we can rewrite more concisely as
1 ￿ E[max[p;qB] j qB ￿
p
2cA] ￿ E[min[qB;qA] j qB >
p
2cA] ￿ cA: (11)
16To see that deviation could be pro￿table, we send cA ￿! 0. Since p ￿
p
2cA
the payo⁄from passing (10) goes to 1￿E[qB] = 1￿1=2 = 1=2. On the other
hand, in the deviation payo⁄ (11), the second term (E[max[p;qB] j qB ￿ p
2cA]) and the last term (cA) go to zero and the whole expression approaches
1￿E[min[qB;qA]] = 1￿1=3 = 2=3. Hence, a bidder A with su¢ ciently small
search cost would want to deviate from the supposed equilibrium and search
regardless of whether he is the high or the low bidder.
This implies that if we had an equilibrium in which all ci ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] bid p
2ci, then there must be a certain proportion of types who always search.
But we can further show that this could also not be an equilibrium, because
then all types ci < ^ c who always search would want to deviate to bidding
zero in the early round, i.e., to bidding just late. To see this, suppose cA < ^ c.
Then, the payo⁄ from searching when A is the low bidder
p
2cA ￿ bB is
independent of his own bid,
1 ￿ E[qA j qA ￿ bB] ￿ E[min[qA;bB;l] j qA > bB],
where if you recall, bB;l denotes the ￿nal round bid of B which could be either
1, if B has passed, or max[qB;bB], if he has searched. Since this payo⁄ is
independent of bA, when A is the low bidder, he is indi⁄erent between bidding p
2cA and 0. On the other hand, if A is the high bidder bA =
p
2cA ￿ p, then
his payo⁄is given by (11) which is decreasing in his early bid bA. This makes
him strictly prefer to bid zero. Hence, A maximizes his expected payo⁄ by
mimicking the behavior of the zero cost type and bids zero in the early round.
4
The previous example has shown that in the free bidding equilibrium
there will be some types with su¢ ciently low search costs who will search
with certainty. Moreover, given that they always search, they strictly prefer
to bid zero in the early round. These incentives give rise to the late bidding
behavior. In the following example we will explore how bidding behavior in
the early round depends on the number of bidders.
Example 3 (arbitrary number of bidders): Consider the parameters
from Example 1 but now suppose that the number of bidders is arbitrary,
n. Since F is uniform we have that f(1;n￿1)(x) = (n ￿ 1)xn￿2. Then, ^ c(n) =
n￿1
2(n+1) and 1￿E[q] = 1=2. Substituting this into (9) we can express the early










2 if ci 2 [ n￿1
2(n+1);1=2]
1 if ci 2 [1=2;1]
.
Figure 2
Notice that both, the bidding function and the threshold ^ c, depend on
the number of bidders. The proportion of late bidders, [0;^ c(n)], grows and
the bidding function in the region [^ c(n);1=2] also gets steeper as n increases.
This makes an intuitive sense. When higher number of bidders draw outside
prices and bid them in the auction, this raises the expected ￿nal auction
price. Thus, the expected surplus from winning the auction decreases. On
the other hand, the expected surplus from searching is independent of number
of bidders. Therefore, when number of bidders is high, being caught up in
the auction with a high early bid is more likely to be become less valuable
than bidding zero and searching.
The free bidding equilibrium helps us understand the incentives for early
bidding in the dynamic auction. Bidders who are in￿ exible have incentives to
avoid searching and bid for the right to stay passive early in the auction. The
remaining bidders, who are ￿ exible, would not ￿nd this strategy pro￿table.
Rather, these types prefer to search even in the case when they are in the
position of the high bidder. This however defeats the purpose of bidding
18early. From the perspective of the ￿ exible types early bidding only reduces
the surplus in the auction, which is the reason why they search and bid just
late.
4 Comparison to a Static Auction Format
The environment modeled in this paper is dynamic. Naturally, early bidding
can only arise in auction that is su¢ ciently long. Short auctions provide dif-
ferent incentives for acquisition of information. Bidders have to decide before
the auction whether to learn outside prices without being able to coordinate
their decisions. The di⁄erence in incentives will have implications for the
social surplus and revenues that sellers can capture in the dynamic versus
static auction format. In this section we demonstrate that the dynamic auc-
tion always generates higher social surplus than the static auction. However
the question of revenue is ambiguous. Both Rezende (2005) and Compte &
Jehiel (2007) argue that for a large number of bidders dynamic auction is
more pro￿table. In addition Compte & Jehiel note that this revenue ranking
may not hold in general. We provide an explicit example in which the sta-
tic auction generates higher revenue for a particular distribution of bidders￿
search costs.
The ￿rst step is to describe the environment and characterize the bidding
equilibrium. The static auction has only a single bidding round. Within the
framework of our model this means that the game begins with the searching
round, where all bidders can simultaneously decide to search. This is followed
by the bidding round, in which all bidders simultaneously place a single round
of bids. We begin by characterizing bidding equilibrium for the static auction.
In doing so we refer to both cases of private and common outside prices.
Proposition 3: Suppose that outside prices are identically and indepen-
dently distributed. In the equilibrium of the static auction, bidders use a
threshold strategy in the searching round,
￿(ci) =
￿
1 if ci 2 [0;￿ c(n)]
0 if ci 2 [￿ c(n);1 ￿ E[q]] ;







￿i]] + 1[z>￿ c]E[1 ￿ qi])g
(1;n￿1)(z)dz = ￿ c:
19In the ￿nal bidding round bidders bid their best outside alternative, bi;l.
Proof: Appendix.
For common outside prices the equilibrium looks very similar.
Corollary 2: Suppose that outside prices are common. The bidding
equilibrium is equivalent to that described by the Proposition 3 with the
exception that the threshold ￿ c is given by
Z ￿ c
0
1[z>￿ c]E[1 ￿ q]g
(1;n￿1)(z)dz = ￿ c:
Proof: Appendix.
The equilibrium is fairly simple and intuitive. It involves threshold strate-
gies in the searching round whereby the low search cost types, who are below
the threshold, ￿ c, search and the high search cost types, those above the
threshold, pass. There is very little di⁄erence between the cases of common
and independent outside prices. With independent outside prices searching
is a bit more valuable than in the case of common outside prices. The reason
is that the only time when the expected payo⁄of an individual bidder di⁄ers
between these two environments is in the case when all bidders search. When
prices are independent, the expected price a bidder pays is E[min[qi;q
(1)
￿i]],
i.e., either he looses the auction and pays his outside price qi or he wins
the auction and pays the highest price of the remaining bidders, q
(1)
￿i. When
prices are common, then the expected price is higher, E[q].
4.1 Comparing E¢ ciency
Let us now compare the two auction formats. First we address the issue of
e¢ ciency. What determines the social surplus is the amount of trade less the
sum of the search costs. Let ti 2 f0;1g indicate whether bidder i has traded





si(1 ￿ ci) + (1 ￿ si)ti:
20The ex-ante surplus is de￿ned in a similar way. Let ￿i be the probability of




￿i(1 ￿ ci) + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i:
We index by fD; Sg the social surplus for the dynamic and the static auc-
tion respectively. The next proposition establishes that the dynamic auction
dominates the static auction in terms of social surplus.













To see the intuition behind this result let us focus on the case when
all bidders have their search costs in the relevant cost range, ci 2 [0;1 ￿
E[q]]. In the equilibrium of the dynamic auction the early bidding function
plays the role of a coordinating device. Therefore, the high bidder in the
early bidding round is also the bidder with the highest search cost. This
bidder passes and gets the object in the auction. Everyone else searches and
buys the object for the outside price. Thus, in equilibrium of the dynamic
auction all bidders with the costs in the relevant cost range trade. Moreover,
it is the bidder with the highest cost that passes. On the other hand, in
the static auction, bidders use threshold strategy in the searching round.
This necessarily implies that there will be some miscoordination of searching
decisions. The miscoordination can be of two kinds: (i) at least two bidders
pass or (ii) all bidders search. Both cause ine¢ ciencies. In the ￿rst case
one of the bidders ends up not trading when getting the outside price would
increase social surplus, 1 ￿ ci ￿ 0. In the second case all bidders trade, but
had one of them passed (for example the one with the highest search cost) he
would have traded in the auction while saving the search cost which would
of course increase social surplus.
214.2 Comparing Revenue
Next we turn to the question of the revenue. This is certainly more involved.
For the purposes of simplicity we limit our view to the simpler case of common
valuations. From the seller￿ s perspective, in the static auction, the expected
auction price is E[q] as long as at most one bidder passes. Otherwise, the

















Similarly, in the dynamic auction, the seller expects to get E[max[bi;q]] if at











In order to compare the two revenues we express ￿D in the form of ￿S by







































(2;n)(1 ￿ E[q]) ￿ G
(2;n)(~ c))(1 ￿ E[q]);
where we substituted for ￿D and used the fact that ~ c 2 [0;1 ￿ E[q]] to get
form step 1 to step 2. The upper bound on ~ c is implied by the fact that any
type with cost higher than 1 ￿ E[q] would never search. Hence, the revenue
cannot be lower than when all types in the relevant cost range search, i.e.,
11This is just a rearranged expression from Corrolary 2.
22when ~ c = 1 ￿ E[q]. To get from step 2 to step 3 we substituted from (6).
Now one can integrate the left-hand side by parts and rearrange to obtain
G





The next proposition establishes the relationship between the two thresholds
(￿ c; ~ c), and revenues in the two auction formats.
Proposition 5: The dynamic auction generates higher revenue than the
static auction when ~ c is lower than ￿ c,
￿
D > ￿
S if and only if ~ c < ￿ c,
where ￿ c is determined by (12) and ~ c by (13).
The Proposition 5 recasts the comparison of revenues in terms of compar-
ison of thresholds. The advantage of this is that the thresholds have a nice
graphical representation (see Figure 3). This allows us on one hand to verify
some claims in the literature stating that the dynamic auction dominates the
static auction in terms of revenue for standard parametrization (e.g., uniform
distributions) and also asymptotically as n ! 1 (see Example 4a). On the
other hand, we are also able to identify a case where static auction can be
more pro￿table than the dynamic auction (see Example 4b).
Example 4a: We adopt the parameters from the Example 1. There are
two bidders and both F and G are uniform on [0;1]. We can represent the
thresholds ￿ c and ~ c as shown in the Figure 3 (part a) below.
23Figure 3
The threshold for the static auction is given by the intersection of the
downward-sloping dashed line (left-hand side of (12)) and the distribution
G(1;n￿1)(z) = z. The threshold for the dynamic auction is given by the
intersection of the horizontal dotted line (left-hand side of (13)) with the
distribution G(2;n)(z) = z(2 ￿ z). From the picture it is clear that ~ c < ￿ c.
Indeed, numerically, ￿D = 19=24 > 13=18 = ￿S.
Next we discuss the intuition for why does the dynamic auction dominate
the static auction asymptotically. The more formal argument along with the
picture can be found in the Appendix. Notice that since ￿ c > 1 ￿ E[q], then
G(1;n￿1)(x) as an extreme value distribution converges to 0 on x 2 [0;1￿E[q]]
as n ! 1. Hence, the intersection with 1￿ x
1￿E[q] must occur at x = ￿ c = 1 in
the limit. On the other hand, for any n, G(2;n) is a strictly increasing function.
The area underneath it, on [0;1 ￿ E[q]], corresponds to (1 ￿ E[q])G(2;n)(~ c),
where ~ c 2 (0;1). This implies that in the limit ~ c < ￿ c and hence ￿D > ￿S. 4
In the next example we show that it is possible to ￿nd an example of a
distribution G for which the static auction generates higher revenue than its
dynamic counterpart.
Example 4b: Figure 4 illustrates such possibility for the distribution
with the full support which was the assumption throughout the paper.
24Figure 4
One could verify this analytically. Suppose there are two bidders. For the
sake of simplicity we work with a distribution containing an atom12 on c = 0.
Consider F uniform on [0;1] and G(x) = 9
10 + 1
10x on [0;1]. Furthermore
assume that when bids are tied the winner of the auction is chosen randomly.
The dynamic auction: The early round bidding function is
p
2ci and 1 ￿
E[q] = 1=2. To compute revenue, notice that the expected payment of bidder
A with cost cA > 0 is
PA(cA) =
8
> > > > <
























if cA > 1=2
:












The static auction: The revenue for the static auction is computed in the
similar manner. There, the threshold ￿ c can be computed form (12), ￿ c = 1=3.
12Any distribution with an atom can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a distribu-
tion with a full support.




















1=2 1=2dy if cA > 1=3
:
Then, the revenue for the static auction is 0:505.
The static auction generates higher revenue in cases when the major por-
tion of the mass is centered on types with low search costs. Recall, that in
the dynamic auction, the seller bene￿ts from early bidding, because of the
extra surplus that it transfers from the high bidder to the seller. In the sta-
tic auction, the seller bene￿ts when bidders miscoordinate their search. If at
least two bidders don￿ t search, then the seller captures the highest possible
surplus. The distribution that puts lots of weight on the low search cost
types has two e⁄ects. On one hand, it lowers the pro￿tability of the dynamic
auction by minimizing the bene￿ts from early bidding. On the other hand it
increases the pro￿tability in the static auction by allowing su¢ cient chances
of search-miscoordination. Both e⁄ects combine to make the static auction
preferable.
5 Discussion
In this paper we presented a model of an Internet-type auction, which pro-
vides a rationale for commonly observed bidding patterns. We decided to
keep the model as simple as possible and focused primarily on describing
clearly the underlying economic intuition. Nevertheless, further generaliza-
tions are not only possible but could also yield other useful insights. Here we
brie￿ y discuss two possible extensions that may be important13. The ￿rst is
a richer modeling of bidder valuations. In this paper we have fully abstracted
from modeling heterogeneity of bidders￿valuations. Our primary objective
here was to study how the heterogeneity in individual search abilities pro-
vides incentives for searching and bidding. One may have noticed that the
common value for the object, 1, does not appear in any of the early round
bidding functions in the relevant cost range. This indicates that a private
value would not have a signi￿cant impact on the equilibrium behavior that
13Almost certainly one could ￿nd other relevant extensions.
26we have described. The model could be extended to account for independent
and private values, but of course, this would have to come at the cost of
increasing the level of complexity and possibly obscuring the intuition.
The second extension may involve allowing for multiple searching and
bidding rounds. This would be certainly interesting and should be pursued
in the future work. It is reasonable to suppose that bidders could acquire
information before the auction and that they arrive sequentially rather than
bid simultaneously. Furthermore bidders might search multiple times and
have the chance to revise their bids several times before the ￿nal bidding
round. All of these variations are interesting and may alter results to teach us
more about bidding behavior on the Internet. The current model is tailored
speci￿cally to address the idea that bidders bid early to avoid undertaking a
possibly costly and lengthy search for alternatives. We believe that the model
presented allows the most direct approach to studying these incentives.
To summarize, our objective was to examine bidding incentives when we
allow bidders to search for outside prices. We found that in equilibrium,
the private outside prices generate behavior which leads to three empirically
relevant outcomes: early, late, and multiple bidding. The early and the
multiple bidding arise from the incentives to avoid costly search. A crucial
feature of the equilibrium is the searching-when-loosing strategy which allows
early bidders to implicitly coordinate their search decisions. The late bidding
on the other hand is caused by the spillover bene￿ts that multiple price-draws
have on the expected auction price. The winner of the auction pays a price
which is lower than his best alternative. A contribution of this paper is in
that it interprets frequently occurring bidding patterns in the data in the
light of incentives to acquire information.
We were further interested in comparing the welfare and the revenue in
our dynamic auction with the benchmark static auction. According to our
expectations the dynamic auction dominates the static auction in terms of
welfare. The reason is the usage of the searching-when-loosing strategy in the
equilibrium, which allows least e¢ cient bidder to stay passive. The question
of revenue is much more di¢ cult. There, the answer is ambiguous. It has
been believed that the dynamic auction is more pro￿table than the static
auction. We con￿rm that this is true in the limit. However, we also provide
an example in which the static auction produces higher revenue than the
dynamic auction. In light of this, it is not so obvious that the dynamic
auction is always preferable. In judging the costs and bene￿ts of dynamic
auction one should notice that the case when the static auction is more
27pro￿table seems pretty rare and unlikely to occur in the real life. Therefore,
we sill feel comfortable concluding that dynamic auction is on most occasions
the more attractive alternative.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider strategy pro￿le given by Proposition 1.
Part (i): Suppose ci ￿ 1 ￿ E[q].
Claim 1: If i is the low bidder, W 6= i, then, ￿i = 1.
Proof: Suppose W = j: In equilibrium j passes and bids 1 in the ￿nal
round. Then ￿￿i = 0 and i￿ s payo⁄ from searching is given by (4). When
he passes, then bi;l = 1 and gets 0, by (5): Since (4) is no less than (5), i.e.,
1 ￿ E[q] ￿ ci ￿ 0, searching is a best response. ￿
Claim 2: If W = i, then, ￿i = 0:
Proof: Since W = i, then p = b
(1)
￿i and all other bidders search, ￿￿i = 1.
If i passes, then he gets (3). His payo⁄ from searching is given by (2). The












= ci ￿ 0;
i.e., i optimally passes. ￿
Claim 3: In the early bidding round, the optimal bid b￿





i;y]f(y)dy ￿ E[q] = ci.
Proof: Bidder i will chose bi which maximizes his expected payo⁄. Notice
that continuation payo⁄s (2), (3), (4), and (5) do not depend on the own
bid. Bid bi only determines whether i is the high or the low bidder. Here we
show that conditional on the continuation play following the equilibrium, b￿
i
weakly dominates any other bid .
By bidding zero, bi = 0, i can guarantee for himself (4),1￿E[q]￿ci. If he
raises his bid to bi > 0; then, if W 6= i, then the behavior in the continuation
game is una⁄ected and i still gets the same payo⁄. However, if W = i, then
30p = b
(1)
￿i and in the continuation game i passes while everyone else searches.






Notice that since (3) is decreasing in b
(1)
￿i, then whenever i prefers to be the
high bidder at b
(1)
￿i = bi (the worst possible case for i), then he also prefers
to be the high bidder for any lower b
(1)
￿i, i.e.,










Hence, the optimal bid b￿








i that violate (14), i.e.,










i;y]f(y)dy ￿ E[q] = ci.
Since F has a full support, the right-hand side is monotone increasing in b￿
i
from 0 to 1 ￿ E[q]. Thus, in the relevant cost range [0;1 ￿ E[q]], for any ci
we can ￿nd a unique b￿
i that satis￿es the equality. ￿
Part (ii): Suppose ci > 1 ￿ E[q].
Claim 1: In the searching round, i passes, ￿i = 0.
Proof: By passing, bidder i can secure at least zero, while if he searches,
then his highest possible payo⁄ is1 ￿ E[q] ￿ ci < 0. Hence, he optimally
passes. ￿
Claim 2: In the early round, b￿
i = 1.
Proof: Notice that for ci > 1 ￿ E[q] inequality (14) is always satis￿ed
since the left-hand side is less than zero and the right-hand side cannot be
negative. Hence, bidder i will optimally bid his maximum willingness to pay,
b￿
i = v = 1. ￿
31Q.E.D.
￿ ￿ ￿
Before we give the proof of Proposition 3 we need to restate the contin-
uation payo⁄s (2), (3), (4) and (5) for the case of independent and private














xf(x)dx ￿ ci (15)









On the other hand, when W 6= i and we suppose that the high bid b
(1)
￿i is




















xf(x)dx ￿ ci (17)














Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider strategy pro￿le given in Proposition 2.
As a ￿rst step we characterize best responses in the searching round. Con-
sider bidder i with cost ci. We can classify histories as those on-equilibrium
path: f0;?g, f0;kg, fp;kg and f1;kg, where p 2 [￿(^ c);1), and k is an index
of any bidder; and those o⁄-equilibrium path: fp;kg, where p 2 (0;￿(^ c)).
32After on-path histories f0;jg and fp;jg, bidder i believes that Pr(cj >
^ c) = 1 and since W = j in equilibrium j is passing (￿￿i = 0). Similarly, after
history f1;kg since p = 1, i believes that at least for one of his opponents
Pr(cj > 1 ￿ E[q]) = 1 and therefore in equilibrium j is passing (￿￿i = 0).
Hence, after all of these histories if i passes as well he gets zero. His best
response is to search if it￿ s pro￿table,
1 ￿ E[q] ￿ ci: (19)
After histories f0;?g, f0;ig and fp;ig bidder i believes that for all of his
opponents it is true that Pr(cj ￿ ci) = 1 and since W = i in equilibrium
all are searching (￿￿i = 1). His best response is to search if the payo⁄ from


























(1;n￿1)(y)dyf(x)dx ￿ ci: (20)
After o⁄-path histories fp;ig and fp;jg, where p 2 (0;￿(^ c)); i￿ s belief is
the same (see the Proposition 2) as after on-path histories fp;ig and fp;jg
respectively. Hence, his best response is given by (20) in the ￿rst case and
by (19) in the second case.
Next we establish the equilibrium.
Part (i): Suppose ci < ^ c.
Claim 1: In the searching round bidder i searches, ￿i = 1.
Proof: The equilibrium history is f0;?g. Then since










33Since bi = 0, then by (20), bidder i searches. ￿
Claim 2: In the early round bidder i bids zero b￿
i = 0.
Proof: Here we show that deviation to ~ bi > 0 is not pro￿table. First recall
that when i bids zero, then it must be that W 6= i. Rather than writing down
his expected payo⁄, it is more useful to write down his payo⁄for the separate
cases, i.e., when c
(1)







(1;n￿1)(y)dyf(x)dx ￿ ci (21)
and in the opposite case when c
(1)




xf(x)dx ￿ ci: (22)
Next we show that in both of these cases bidding ~ bi > 0 is no better than
bidding zero. If ~ bi > 0, then there are three possible cases: (i) c
(1)
￿i < ^ c, (ii)
c
(1)
￿i ￿ ^ c and W 6= i and (iii) c
(1)
￿i ￿ ^ c and W = i.
Case (i) c
(1)
￿i < ^ c: In this case all other bidders bid zero and search. That
implies that W = i and p = 0. In the continuation game all other bidders





















￿i ￿ ^ c and W 6= i: Here at least one of the remaining bidders
has bid a positive amount and has outbid bidder i which implies that p > 0.
Notice that if p 2 (0;￿(^ c)) then the play is o⁄the equilibrium path but since
the beliefs are set appropriately (see Proposition 2.), the incentives both on-
and o⁄-equilibrium path are the same and can be analyzed simultaneously.
In this case the high bidder passes, ￿￿i = 1. If i passes as well he gets zero
34which is strictly less than (22). The payo⁄ from searching is given by (17)
which is equal to (22). Again deviation is not pro￿table.
Case (iii): c
(1)
￿i ￿ ^ c and W = i: This case is more di¢ cult. Here, in
equilibrium ￿(^ c) ￿ p ￿ ~ bi. Since W = i, then all other bidders are searching,
￿￿i = 1. Bidder i can either search or pass. Suppose ￿rst that he searches.











To see that this payo⁄is indeed lower than (22) it su¢ ces to look at its upper
bound, i.e., when ~ bi = ￿(^ c) = ^ p since it is decreasing both in p and bi. In































































which is a contradiction since ^ p > 0 and F has a full support. Thus, deviation
to ~ bi followed by searching is not pro￿table.










As before we look at the upper bound, i.e., when ~ bi = ￿(^ c) = ^ p. Bidder i














(1;n￿1)(y) ￿ E[q] ￿ ci
which is a contradiction by (9) since ci < ^ c. Even in this case deviation to ~ bi
is not pro￿table.
Thus, we have established that deviation to ~ bi > 0 is never strictly better
than bidding zero. ￿
Part (ii): Suppose ^ c ￿ ci < 1 ￿ E[q].
Claim 1: If W 6= i, then ￿i = 1.
Proof: In this case the history is fp;jg where p 2 [￿(^ c);1). Since ci <
1 ￿ E[q], bidder i optimally searches by (19). ￿
Claim 2: If W = i, then ￿i = 0:
Proof: In this case the history is fp;ig where p 2 [0;￿(ci)]. Since











bidder i optimally passes by (20). ￿
Claim 3: In the early bidding round bidder i optimally bids b￿
i which is





(1;n￿1)(y)dy ￿ E[q] = ci.
Proof: This Claim is just a generalization of Claim 3 in the Proposition
1, part (ii). All arguments made there apply here with one exception that
36here we use value functions (15), (16), (17), (18) in place of (2), (3), (4) and
(5). Therefore, we will not repeat the argument here except for stating that
















































(1;n￿1)(y)dy ￿ E[q] = ci.
Since F has a full support, the right-hand side is monotone increasing in b￿
i
from E[q(1;n￿1)]￿E[q] to 1￿E[q]. Recall that ^ c = E[q(1;n￿1)]￿E[min[q;q(1;n￿1)]] >
E[q(1;n￿1)]￿E[q]. Thus, in the cost range [^ c;1￿E[q]], for any ci we can ￿nd
a unique b￿
i that satis￿es the equality. ￿
Part (iii): Suppose ci ￿ 1 ￿ E[q].
Claim 1: In the searching round, ￿i = 1.
Proof: In this case, W = k, where k can be an index of any bidder and
p = 1: Then, by (19) i optimally passes. ￿
Claim 2: In the early bidding round, b￿
i = 1.
Proof: Since ci > 1 ￿ E[q] the left-hand side of (23) is less than zero
and the right-hand side cannot be negative. This implies that bidder i will
optimally bid his maximum willingness to pay which is his value, b￿
i = 1. ￿
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof: Consider the strategy pro￿le given by Proposition 3. In the ￿nal
bidding round, bidders are assumed to bid their best outside alternative as
stated in the (1). Therefore, we only have to worry about the equilibrium
behavior in the searching round. Each bidder has to decide whether to search
or pass. If bidder i searches, then, if all other bidders have costs below the
threshold, c
(1)
￿i ￿ ￿ c, he ends up paying min[qi;q
(1)
￿i]. However, if at least one
37of the other bidders has a cost above ￿ c, then in the equilibrium that bidder
passes and bids 1. Bidder i then ends up paying his outside price, qi. By






















(1;n￿1)(z)dz ￿ ci: (24)
On the other hand, if he passes, then he can only get a non-zero pay-
o⁄ if all other bidders search, i.e., c
(1)










In the equilibrium, there will be a type ￿ c who is exactly indi⁄erent between




















(1;n￿1)(z)dz = ￿ c: (26)
Notice that the left-hand side is always greater than zero. Moreover, for all
(x;y) 2 [0;1]2 it is true that y￿min[y;x] ￿ 1￿x: Since G has a full support
(i.e., y ￿ min[y;x] < 1 ￿ x will occur with positive probability) there will
always be a type ￿ c 2 (0;1 ￿ E[q]) that satis￿es (26). Hence, bidder i best
responds by searching when ci ￿ ￿ c and by passing when ci > ￿ c: ￿
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Proof: The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3. The di⁄erence is
that we use (4) and (5) to construct the equivalents (24) and (25). Then, in




(1;n￿1)(x)dx = ￿ c: (27)
38Here it is easy to see that there is always ￿ c 2 (0;1 ￿ E[q]) which satis￿es
(27). ￿
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
First we look at the common prices environment. We begin with part (i).









j=2 c(j) if c(1) ￿ 1 ￿ E[q]
n ￿ l ￿
Pn
j=2+l c(j) if c(2+l) ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] < c(1+l)
1 if 1 ￿ E[q] < c(n)
; (28)
where l 2 f0;n ￿ 2g. The ￿rst case refers to types of all bidders falling in
the relevant cost range. In that case everyone but the the bidder with c(1)
searches. The middle case covers the intermediate distribution of individual
types when some bidders have costs above 1 ￿ E[q]. All those bidders pass
and only one of them wins the auction and trades. Everyone else searches.
Hence, n ￿ l bidders trade and n ￿ l ￿ 1 search. In the last case all types
have costs that are above the threshold 1￿E[q]. In this case all bidders pass
and one of them wins the auction and trades.









j=1 c(j) if c(1) ￿ ￿ c
n ￿ l ￿
Pn
j=2+l c(j) if c(2+l) ￿ ￿ c < c(1+l)
1 if ￿ c < c(n)
; (29)
for l 2 f0;n ￿ 2g. There are two di⁄erences between the welfare functions.
The ￿rst di⁄erence is in the top case when all bidders have costs bellow the
respective threshold. In this case W D
ep > W S
ep. The reason is that in the static
auction all bidders search, whereas in the dynamic auction one of the bidders
(the bidder with type c(1)) passes. In the remaining cases W D
ep = W S
ep:
The second di⁄erence is in the thresholds themselves. By Lemma 2,
￿ c < 1￿E[q]: Since n￿
Pn
j=2 c(j) > n￿
Pn
j=1 c(j) ￿ n￿l￿
Pn
j=2+l c(j) > 1 we
conclude that for all c, W D
ep ￿ W S
ep which proves part (i) of the Proposition.
To show part (ii) it is su¢ cient to identify a case which occurs in equilibrium
with positive probability and for which W D
ep > W S
ep:There are several such
cases, but one that is easily identi￿ed is when c(n) 2 (￿ c;1￿E[q]]: Because G
39has a full support, this case occurs in equilibrium with positive probability,
which implies that W D
ea > W S
ea proving part (ii).
The argument for the case of independent outside prices is exactly the
same with the exception the welfare function for the dynamic auction is a bit
more complicated because there is an additional threshold14, ^ c, that separates









j=1 c(j) if c(1) ￿ ^ c
n ￿
Pn
j=2 c(j) if ^ c < c(1) ￿ 1 ￿ E[q]
n ￿ l ￿
Pn
j=2+l c(j) if c(2+l) ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] < c(1+l)
1 if 1 ￿ E[q] < c(n)
; (30)
for l 2 f0;n ￿ 2g. For the static auction, W S
ep is identical to (29).
Notice that (28) is a lower bound on W D
ep(c) since it combines the top two
cases of (30) into a single case, n ￿
Pn
j=2 c(j) if c(1) ￿ 1 ￿ E[q] in (28). This
observation allows us to apply the same argument as in the case of common
outside prices to conclude that W D
ep ￿ W S
ep and W D
ea > W S
ea. ￿
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.










is strictly decreasing in k. Hence for k0 < k00 we have ￿(k0) > ￿(k00). ￿
Q.E.D.
Example 4a: Proof of the Asymptotic Result.
The Figure 5 is helpful to understand the proof.
14as de￿ned in Proposition 2
40Figure 5
Consider arbitrary number of bidders n. By (12) de￿ne ￿ cn as a point cor-
responding to the intersection of the straight line 1￿ x
1￿E[q] and G(1;n￿1)(x) =
G(x)n￿1 on [0;1￿E[q]]. Since ￿ c > 1￿E[q] it is easy to see that on the par-
tial domain [0;1 ￿ E[q]] the extreme value distribution converges uniformly
G(x)n￿1 ! 0 as n ! 1. Hence, in the limit we have 1 ￿ ￿ cn
1￿E[q] = 0, i.e.,
￿ cn ! 1 ￿ E[q].
Next, de￿ne ~ cn as the point for which (13) holds. Since G(2;n)(x) is
strictly increasing on [0;1 ￿ E[q]] and G(2;n)(0) = 0, then
R 1￿E[q]
0 G(2;n) <
(1 ￿ E[q])G(2;n)(1 ￿ E[q]). Then, by Intermediate Value Theorem there ex-
ists ~ c 2 (0;1) such that
R 1￿E[q]
0 G(2;n) = (1 ￿ E[q])G(2;n)(~ c). Hence, for an
arbitrary m 2 N, ~ cm < lim
n!1￿ cn. ￿
41